India’s electronics sector sits on a contradiction currently. Under the Atmanirbhar Bharat and Make in India programmes, the country is pushing hard to localise manufacturing and reduce dependence on imports. At the same time, its fast-growing electronics industry still relies on mature production technology, integrated supply chains and cost-competitive components from China.
当前，印度电子产业正处于一种矛盾之中。一方面，在“印度独立自主”（Atmanirbhar Bharat）与“印度制造”（Make in India）两大战略计划的推动下，印度正大力推进制造业本土化，力求减少对进口的依赖。另一方面，其电子产业的快速发展，本质上仍依托于中国的成熟生产工艺、供应链配套以及零部件成本优势。
Neither side can easily walk away from the other. India offers a consumer market of more than 1.4 billion people and rising demand. China offers manufacturing depth, component capability and supplier ecosystems that India cannot replicate in the near term. This tension, rather than any single policy, is shaping how the two industries work together.
换言之，双方在短期内均难以实现“脱钩”，印度拥有逾14亿人口的消费市场规模，需求持续增长，而中国具备深厚的制造业基础、完善的零部件配套能力以及其难以在短时间内复制的供应商生态系统。正是这种非某项单一政策的结构性张力，正塑造两国电子产业之间的合作格局。
The form of that cooperation has already changed. The earlier model, in which Chinese firms set up wholly owned factories and exported complete production lines, is giving way to joint ventures, technology licensing and lighter-asset arrangements. Many Chinese companies now accept minority or shared equity positions, partnering with Indian investors and earning returns through licensing fees, management services and dividends.
现如今合作模式已悄然发生变化，早期中企独资设厂及整线出口的模式，正逐步向合资经营、技术许可以及轻资产安排方式转变。当前，众多中国企业与印度投资者合作，采取参股等非控股模式安排，通过收取许可费、管理服务费及分红等方式获取收益。
The Haier transaction illustrates the trend. In March 2026, Haier completed a sell-down of its Indian appliances business so that Haier and a consortium of Warburg Pincus and Bharti Enterprises each hold 49 percent, with the balance in an employee scheme. TCL has been reported to be exploring a similar shared-ownership structure for its display plant in Andhra Pradesh, seeking to bring in one strategic and one financial Indian partner while retaining a minority stake, though that transaction remains at the negotiation stage.
海尔的一笔交易印证了这一趋势。2026年3月，海尔已完成对其印度家电业务的股权转让，据此，海尔与华平投资及巴帝企业组成的财团分别持有49%的股权，余下份额归属员工持股计划持有。另有报道称，TCL正考虑为其位于安得拉邦的显示器工厂采用类似的共享持股架构，计划引入印方战略及财务投资者各一名，仅保留少数股权，现该交易仍处于协商阶段。
These are not isolated moves. They reflect a wider pattern in which Chinese electronics groups keep operational and technological involvement in India while ceding formal control, allowing them to stay in a growing market without triggering the full weight of Indian investment restrictions.
此类交易并非个案，恰恰反映出中资电子企业在应对印度投资监管的普遍策略，即由中方保留运营及技术参与，形式上让渡控制权，以避免受到印度投资规则的全面限制，使其能够继续立足于这一不断增长的市场中。
On the Indian side, the regulatory position is more open than it was, but only in a qualified way. Press Note 3 of 2020 requires government approval for all investment from countries sharing a land border with India, which includes China.
在印度方面，监管立场较此前有所放宽，但此类放宽仅属有限。2020年第3号公告要求凡来自与印度接壤国家的所有投资均需取得政府批准，其中包括中国。
In March 2026 the Government recalibrated this position, formalised through Press Note 2 of 2026 and the amended FEMA Non-Debt Instruments Rules notified on 2 May 2026. Investment carrying indirect land-border ownership below 10 percent, with no control, may now use the automatic route. For specified manufacturing sectors, including electronic components, electronic capital goods, polysilicon and ingot wafers, approvals are to be decided within 60 days, and this fast-track extends to holdings of up to 49 percent, provided majority ownership and control of the Indian company stay with resident Indians.
2026年3月，印度政府对前述立场作出调整，并通过2026年第2号公告及于2026年5月2日发布的经修订的《FEMA非债务工具规则》予以正式确立：凡涉及与印度接壤国家的间接持股，且持股比例低于百分之十，亦不具备控制权的投资，可适用自动审批路径。此外，对于特定制造业领域，包括电子元件、电子资本货物、多晶硅及单晶硅片等，相关审批应于60日内作出，该快速审批适用于最高不超过49%的持股比例，且印度公司的多数股权及控制权仍应由印度居民控制。
Direct investment by Chinese entities, however, still requires prior government approval regardless of size, and the approval requirement for Pakistan and Bangladesh remains fully in force. Indian majority control is the operative condition throughout, and Production Linked Incentive benefits continue to depend on meeting localisation and value-addition thresholds.
不过，对于中国实体的直接投资，无论规模大小，均须事先获得政府批准。此外，对巴基斯坦和孟加拉国的审批要求仍完全有效。概言之，相关公司须始终由印度居民掌握多数控制权的条件贯穿全程，至于生产挂钩激励（PLI）待遇则取决于其是否满足本地化及增值门槛要求。
The Chinese-side framework has moved in a different direction. Two State Council instruments, Decree 834 on industrial and supply chain security and Decree 835 on countering improper foreign extraterritorial jurisdiction, took effect in spring 2026. Decree 834 subjects supply chain information gathering within China, such as audits, questionnaires and on-site inspections, to closer scrutiny under existing Chinese laws. Decree 835 asserts jurisdiction over conduct outside China where there is an appropriate connection, and allows foreign entities that implement or promote foreign extraterritorial measures to be designated and penalised. Enforcement is primarily administrative, including prohibition orders, exclusion from government procurement, data and exit restrictions, and fines, with potential exposure for individual executives.
中国方面的监管框架则朝着不同的方向演进，国务院第834号令《国务院关于产业链供应链安全的规定》及第835号令《中华人民共和国反外国不当域外管辖条例》，已于2026年春季起施行。第834号令加强了中国境内供应链信息收集活动（如审计、问卷及现场检查）的监管力度。第835号令则确立对具有适当联系之域外行为的管辖权，并规定对实施或协助外国不当域外措施的外国实体予以认定和处罚，其执法方式主要为行政手段，包括禁令、取消政府采购资格、数据及出境限制以及罚款，企业高管个人亦可能面临相关责任风险。
The first action under Decree 835 concerned an EU regulatory investigation, not any India-related measure. It shows that the framework is intended mainly as a defensive and reciprocal response to foreign measures viewed as discriminatory or improperly extraterritorial. As a result, Chinese suppliers involved in India-related projects must pay closer attention to fully understand the regulatory requirements in both China and India.
第835号令项下的首例执法案件涉及一项欧盟监管调查，而非任何与印度有关的举措。此表明，该制度框架仅旨在对被认定具有歧视性或不当域外适用效力的外国制裁措施所作出的防御性及对等回应。因此，参与印度相关项目的中资供应商应投入更多精力，以全面理解和把握中国及印度两国的监管要求。
The Apple supply chain is the clearest illustration of how diversification actually works in practice, and why it is not the same as decoupling. Apple has expanded iPhone assembly in India rapidly through Foxconn and Tata Electronics. India now accounts for roughly a quarter of global iPhone output, and Apple aims to source most United States-bound iPhones from India.
苹果供应链最为直观地诠释了所谓“多元化”在实践中应如何运作，亦明确了其与脱钩的本质区别。苹果已通过富士康和塔塔电子迅速扩大在印度的 iPhone 组装规模。印度目前约占全球 iPhone 产量的四分之一，未来苹果希望其面向美国市场的 iPhone 大部分均来自于印度。
Tata Electronics, which entered the business only after acquiring Wistron’s Indian operations in late 2023, has scaled quickly and, over the five-year PLI period to FY26, narrowly overtook Foxconn in the value of iPhones exported from India. Assembling a unit in India costs a fraction of what it would in the United States, which is why Apple airlifted around two billion dollars of iPhones from India in a single month in early 2025 ahead of a tariff change.
塔塔电子是在 2023 年底收购纬创在印度的业务后才进入这一领域的，但其扩张速度较快。截至 2026 财年的五年 PLI 周期内，其从印度出口的 iPhone 总价值已略微超过富士康。此外，印度单机组装成本远低于美国，亦系苹果在2025年初关税变动前，单月从印度抢运约二十亿美元iPhone之原因。
Yet the deeper point is that this expansion has not severed Apple’s reliance on China. China still assembles the majority of the world’s iPhones and remains the anchor of Apple’s supplier ecosystem, skilled workforce and advanced tooling. What is emerging instead is a more interdependent picture. Apple’s Indian vendors, including Tata Electronics and Foxconn, have begun exporting components such as printed circuit boards and phone housings back to China, reversing the traditional one-way flow in which China supplied parts for Indian assembly.
但更深层次的逻辑在于，此类扩张并未切断苹果对中国的依赖，中国仍承担着全球多数 iPhone的整机配装，并且依然是苹果供应商生态、成熟劳动力及先进工艺的核心支柱。更准确而言，这呈现出的是一种更具相互依赖的格局。苹果在印度的供应商，包括塔塔电子和富士康，已开始将印刷电路板、手机外壳等零部件出口回中国，改变了以往由中国向印度组装环节单向供货的传统流向。
Apple’s strategy is therefore best read as geographic diversification layered on top of a continuing Chinese base, a China Plus One approach rather than a China exit. It shows that the links between China’s manufacturing ecosystem and India’s growing electronics industry are being reconfigured, not broken.
因此，苹果的策略更适宜被理解为：在中国基础之上的地理多元化，即“中国+1”策略，而非“退出中国”。 这亦说明，中国制造业生态与印度日益发展的电子产业之间的联系正在重组，而非被切断。
Looking ahead, three trajectories appear plausible. The first is regulated coexistence, where approvals stay controlled, joint ventures and licensing dominate, and cooperation continues steadily. The second is selective liberalisation, where India eases restrictions further in priority manufacturing sectors as industrial demand grows, building on the 2026 amendments. The third is sustained friction, where geopolitical considerations narrow the space for collaboration.
展望未来，印度监管政策可能出现三种路径：第一种是受监管的共存，即严格控制审批，合资与技术许可成为主流，合作则稳步推进。第二种是选择性放宽，随着产业需求增长，印度在2026年修订基础之上对重点制造业领域进一步放松限制。第三种是持续摩擦，地缘政治因素将压缩合作空间。
For businesses on both sides, the practical reality is that the two legal regimes now pull in opposite directions, and transactions have to be structured with both in view. India increasingly welcomes the capital, technology and supply chain integration that Chinese investment can bring, but on terms that preserve Indian control. China, meanwhile, is tightening the conditions under which its firms and technology can move offshore. The links between the two industries are likely to persist, shaped by the regulatory choices of both governments rather than replaced by them.
对双方企业而言，现实情况是，如今两国的法律体系正朝着相反方向推进，因此交易安排必须同时兼顾两边的要求。印度越来越欢迎中国投资所带来的资本、技术与供应链整合，但前提是需确保印度方面的控制权。与此同时，中国正在收紧本国企业和技术向海外转移的条件。因此，两国电子产业之间的互动仍将延续，但会更多地受到双方政府监管政策的影响，而非被其取代。
Authors: Andy See, Susanah Naushad, Anuj Shah
For further information, please contact:
Andy SEE, Partner, AnJie Broad Law Firm
andy.see@anjielaw.com
