The European Commission’s sixth annual report on the EU FDI Screening Regulation points to a bigger role for the EU cooperation mechanism, with a significant increase in notifications to the Commission and Phase 2 assessments. However, national screening outcomes remained broadly stable, and most formally screened investments were authorised without conditions.
We look at what this means for deals going forward, particularly in light of the new EU FDI Screening Regulation, which will apply from 17 January 2028 (discussed in our earlier blog post series covering the main reforms, sector specific impacts, and multi-jurisdictional filings).
EU cooperation mechanism takes a bigger role – but little change in likelihood of intervention
Both national FDI filings and EU cooperation notifications surged in 2025, with a greater proportion of EU notifications subject to detailed Commission scrutiny. National outcomes nevertheless remained broadly stable, with most cases authorised without conditions (87%), only a very small percentage of cases resulting in prohibitions (1%) or withdrawals (3%), and no change in conditional authorisations (9%).
A surprising surge in EU notifications
The increase in national FDI filings (up 52% from 3,136 in 2024 to 4,773 in 2025) does not come as a surprise, as it follows a long trend of cases increasing year-on-year since the EU Regulation came into force. What is notable, however, is the increase in EU cooperation notifications, which grew by a striking 40% (from 477 in 2024 to 667 in 2025) after a 2% decline in 2024. There could be several potential reasons behind this surge:
- Reason 1: More national cases being formally screened. One likely reason is that 38% of the 4,773 national FI filings reached formal screening in their own jurisdictions (and the Report highlights that this figure would be 65% if Sweden were excluded from this calculation, as it has a high number of national filings that do not require formal screening – due to the broad reach of its regime). While this is a slight decrease from the 41% in 2024, it still means a total increase in national cases being formally screened across the EU. This increase may be owing to a number of things: a general uptick in foreign M&A activity in the EU (about 4%), a shift in focus in the type of M&A activity (with ICT overtaking manufacturing), the addition of three national FDI screening regimes (Ireland, Bulgaria and Greece), and wider screening coverage (six Member States amended their existing regimes).
- Reason 2: Wider use of the EU cooperation mechanism by more Member States. In 2024, Austria, France, Italy and Spain accounted for 76% of notifications to the EU. But screening activity now appears to be spreading beyond these authorities, with those four jurisdictions only accounting for 65% of the notifications submitted to the EU. This does not imply that those Member States have decreased their notifications, but rather that other Member States (such as Ireland, Lithuania and Germany) are making greater use of the EU cooperation mechanism. The Report itself highlights that more Member States issued comments this year (up from around one third in 2024, to 57% in 2025), with the number of comments issued by Member States doubling too (from around 3% in 2024 to 6% in 2025). This is a trend set to continue with the adoption of national screening regimes in Croatia, Cyprus and Greece (which had not come into force at the time of the Report).
- Reason 3: More multi-jurisdictional transactions. The share of notifications to the EU concerning transactions screened in two or more Member States increased from 19% in 2024 to 27% in 2025. This could mean that Member States are increasingly notifying multi-jurisdictional deals to the Commission – or it could mean there are more multi-jurisdictional deals being filed with Member States. It could also reflect that one acquisition can generate notifications from several Member States.
EU notifications subject to closer scrutiny
A higher rate of EU notifications also progressed to Phase 2 in 2025 (12%, up from 8% in 2024). In overall terms, this means that Phase 2 cases more than doubled (an estimated 80 cases in 2025 compared to 38 in 2024). Over half of these Phase 2 cases involved the manufacturing sector (53%), with the target’s activities in critical technologies the most prominent factor contributing to further scrutiny.
This increased volume alone does not explain why a greater proportion of EU notifications proceeded to Phase 2, and the Report similarly does not give reasons for this change. However, there are a number of potential factors behind the increased scrutiny:
- Reason 1: More security-sensitive manufacturing transactions. Manufacturing’s share of all EU notifications increased from 25% in 2024 to 27% in 2025, and its share of Phase 2 cases similarly increased from 50% to 53%. Within the Phase 2 breakdown for critical technology manufacturing, aerospace’s share increased from 16% in 2024 to 28% in 2025, while access to sensitive information increased from 5% to 12% within the manufacturing risk-factor breakdown. This suggests a general increase in transactions involving strategic capabilities and sensitive information – or an increased focus by the Commission on such cases.
- Reason 2: Increased vigilance for strategic transactions. The Report expressly links Russia’s war and geopolitical uncertainty to the need to protect critical raw materials, advanced technologies and infrastructure. The increased rate of Phase 2 cases could reflect a heightened vigilance, with the Commission taking a closer look at supply dependencies, strategic capabilities and sensitive information.
- Reason 3: A shifting approach to US investors. We are also seeing a gradual shift in how authorities approach US investors, including financial investors. This is not driven by concerns about the investors’ own investment strategies, but over concerns that it may act as a potential gateway for the extraterritorial application of US laws to the EU target, its technology, or its data.
Outcomes largely unchanged
The Report does not shed light on the percentage of Phase 2 cases that were cleared, withdrawn or prohibited. However, despite the increased number of EC notifications and the increase in Phase 2 referrals, the Commission issued an opinion in less than 2% of all notified transactions (unchanged from the 2% in 2024). Similarly, national outcomes have stayed largely the same, with only a very small percentage of cases resulting in prohibitions (1%) or withdrawals (3%) and no change in conditional authorisations (9%). This suggests that the increased role of the EU cooperation mechanism is having minimal impact on a deal’s chances of getting cleared.
More of the same? What to expect from the updated Regulation
The trend towards greater EU cooperation looks likely to continue when the revised Regulation starts applying on 17 January 2028. As discussed in our earlier blog, the common minimum screening scope will require adjustments to national regimes (see our blog post on Germany’s proposed reforms to its FDI regime, introduced in part to implement the requirements of the new EU FDI Screening Regulation), while stronger coordination obligations will bring authorities closer together on multi-jurisdictional deals. This points to continued scrutiny and potentially more filings, rather than a lighter screening workload.
One concern is that the recast Regulation may push the number of Phase 2 cases even higher. Fixing the duration of Phase 1 to 45 days is welcome (see our earlier blog post for further details). However, FDI proceedings inherently require coordination between multiple government stakeholders, which frequently leads to delays. If a decision has not been reached on a case when the Phase 1 deadline expires, it may move into Phase 2 for purely technical reasons, rather than because of any substantive concerns.
Whether this translates to more conditions or prohibitions is less clear. As this earlier blog explains, Commission opinions will carry greater procedural weight, with Member States required to explain how they have taken them into account – but final decisions remain with the national authority. Better coordination could identify risks previously missed, while broader screening could also capture more straightforward deals. Low intervention rates may therefore persist, even as the cooperation mechanism becomes more influential and more deals require Commission scrutiny. For deal teams, more of the same may mean a continued gap between the high likelihood of clearance and the increased workload required to get there.
It also remains unfortunate that the substance of any comments or opinions issued under the EU cooperation mechanism are not revealed to transaction parties. It is fully understood that these may contain sensitive information, including information obtained from intelligence services. Yet a proper right to be heard should mean that parties are informed of the substance where possible, as soon as the comments or opinions are received. This holds true even though Member States are not required to strictly follow them.
The types of investments likely to be subject to increased Commission scrutiny under the Regulation may also be caught by the upcoming Industrial Accelerator Act. As discussed in this blog, this could mean additional filings and information requests, even where the investment raises no security concerns, and even where clearance may be the most likely outcome in the end.

For further information, please contact:
Christoph Barth, Partner, Linklaters




