It seems rather unfortunate that a lot of major and heart-wrenching cases of “hit and run” have happened recently, most of which were caught on camera and posted online.
The question now is, how are they categorized and punished by our current criminal laws? In this two-part series, the Supreme Court, in a January 2022 case, found an opportunity to finally settle this type of “crime,” and how it should be properly prosecuted.
The case of Morales v. People (G.R. No. 240337, 4 January 2022) involves information filed against the accused for the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property and multiple physical injuries. The MTCC convicted Morales of the crime and was sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of one month and 21 days to two months and ordered him to pay damages to the victims. The MTCC found that the proximate cause of the collision was the recklessness and negligence of Morales in driving his van.
The Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals both affirmed MTCC’s decision but the CA modified the same as to the penalty imposed and the damages granted. The CA explained that the penalty prescribed for reckless imprudence is dependent on whether the act, if committed with intent, would have resulted in a grave felony, less grave felony, or light felony. The CA ruled that a straight penalty taken from arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods should be imposed in the case at bar. Morales then elevated the case before the SC. The SC upheld Morales’ conviction but modified the penalty imposed.
The SC discussed the characterization of the quasi-offense under Art. 365 of the Revised Penal Code, “imprudence” and “negligence.” The RPC defines reckless imprudence as voluntarily, but without malice, doing or failing to do an act from which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing or failing to perform such an act, taking into consideration his/her employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition and other circumstances regarding persons, time, and place.
Further, the SC cited its decision in the case of Ivler that simple and reckless imprudence are distinct species of crimes, separately defined and penalized under the framework of our penal laws.
Reckless imprudence is not merely a way of committing a crime. The SC noted that: (1) the object of punishment in quasi-crimes is the mental attitude or condition behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight, while in intentional crimes, the act itself is punished; (2) the legislature intended to treat quasi-crimes as distinct offenses otherwise they would have been subsumed under the mitigating circumstance of minimal intent; and (3) the penalty structure for quasi-crimes differ from intentional crimes in that the criminal negligence bears no relation to the individual wilful crime but is set in relation to a whole class, or series of crimes.
Thus, the correct way of alleging quasi-crimes is to state that their commission resulted in damage, either to a person or property, such as reckless imprudence resulting in homicide or simple imprudence causing damage to property.
However, the SC recognizes that there are two approaches in the prosecution of quasi-crimes. The first applies Article 48 (complex crimes) of the RPC while the second forbids its application. Article 48 allows the single prosecution of multiple felonies falling under either of two categories, namely: (1) when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies; and (2) when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other. Light felonies are excluded in Article 48 and must be charged separately from resulting acts penalized as grave or less grave offenses. In complex crimes, the accused will serve only the maximum penalty for the most serious crime. Meanwhile, the second approach sanctions a single prosecution for all the effects of the quasi-crime collectively alleged in one charge, regardless of their number and severity.
The SC finally declared that after the exhaustion of numerous case laws, Article 48 is not applicable to quasi-crimes. The SC forbids the “complexing” of a single quasi-crime by breaking its resulting acts into separate offenses (except light felonies) to keep inviolate the conceptual distinction between quasi-crimes and intentional crimes. Consequently, the splitting of charges under Article 365 which results in rampant occasions of impermissible second prosecution based on the same acts or omissions are avoided.
The imposition of the correct penalty and abandonment of all other cases in contrary to this disposition will be discussed in the next article.
The Daily Tribune
