There are many factors that contribute to events that result in ship collisions. Some of these are set out below[1]:
- Haste to arrive at a port in daylight or on a certain tide.
- Reluctance to ‘lose face’ when doubt is creeping in.
- Reluctance of a watch officer to disturb his captain who may be snatching a tiny rest after many hours on the bridge.
- Steaming too close inshore to give passengers a good look at some exotic island.
- Mistaking one navigational mark for another.
- A failure in understanding between a captain and his navigational officer or pilot.
- Excessive economy – mindedness causing a captain to cut corners.
- British or American charts used by someone not thoroughly conversant with the language — or for that matter say a Japanese chart used by a European.
Definition of Collision
The term “collision” generally refers to a direct contact and/or impact between vessels. However, this need not necessarily be the contact between the vessel’s respective hulls. Contact with an anchor chain or with the fishing net of a trawler has been held to be contact within the meaning of the expression.[2]
Collision may also encompass situations where there was no physical contact. For example, a ship proceeding in excessive speed can cause another ship to sink or to suffer chafing damage against a wharf simply by the swell or wash she created The Royal Eagle[3]; The Royal Sovereign.[4]
Apportionment of Liability
In collision cases, the court arrives at the apportionment of liability or the degree of fault proved by evidence judicially arrived at and sufficiently made out.[5]
The degree of fault of the colliding vessels is not always easy to ascertain. In The Linde,[6] Brandon J commented on the process that unless a clear preponderance of blame on one side or the other exists, liability should be divided equally.
Where the court finds it impossible to arrive at a clear apportionment of liability, it may invoke Section 1 of the United Kingdom Maritime Conventions Act 1911 (“UKMCA”).[7] In The Anneliese, [8] Davies LJ explained that Section 1 of the UKMCA should be interpreted to mean that liability in a collision at sea must be equally shared unless there is evidence of differing degrees of fault. If the court can assess the degree of fault, it must apportion the liability accordingly.
International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea
To mitigate the risks of collision at sea, the International Maritime Organization (“IMO”) had developed the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea (“COLREGs”), first established in 1972.
The COLREGs include 41 rules that are divided into six sections:
(a) Part A – General;
(b) Part B – Steering and Sailing;
(c) Part C – Lights and Shapes;
(d) Part D – Sound and Light Signals;
(e) Part E – Exemptions; and
(f) Part F – Verification of compliance with the provisions of the Convention.
In this article, we will discuss some of the key provisions of COLREGs such as Rules 5, 6, 7, 10, 13, and 15.
Rule 5 – Look out
One of the most fundamental provisions under COLREGs is Rule 5, which mandates that every vessel shall maintain a proper lookout at all times using all available means, including sight, hearing, and radar. A failure to maintain a proper lookout is a common cause of collisions, as demonstrated in the case of The Sea Star.[9]
Here, the vessel Sea Star, fully loaded with crude oil, inexplicably altered its course to starboard, turning a safe situation into one of acute danger, resulting in a catastrophic collision with the Herta Barbosa. In this case, the court had found that the Sea Star was seriously at fault, attributing the incident to the defective lookout.
Rule 6 – Safe Speed
Rule 6 governs the safe speed of vessels. Under this provision, every vessel shall at all times proceed at a safe speed, allowing them to take proper and effective action to avoid collision and be stopped within a distance appropriate to the prevailing circumstances and conditions.
The importance of this rule was highlighted in the collision between the E. R. Wallonia and the Nedlloyd Seine in the South China Sea on 23 October 1980.[10]
In this case, both ships were found at fault for excessive speed and failing to keep a proper lookout. The Nedlloyd Seine, the give-way ship under the COLREGs, was found to be more at fault for maintaining 18 knots despite reduced visibility from a sudden rainstorm. On the other hand, the E. R. Wallonia had also failed to reduce speed or have a proper crew on the bridge. Hence, in this case, the Admiralty Judge had only apportioned 60% of the blame to the Nedlloyd Seine.
Rule 7 – Risk of Collision
Rule 7 of the COLREGs requires vessels to use all available means — including radar — to assess the risk of collision. If there is any doubt, a risk should be assumed. The rule also warns against making assumptions based on limited information.
The case of Mancunium/Deepdale 2[11] is a classic case where Rule 7 was breached. In this case, the stem of the Mancunium had collided with the port side of the Deepdale about one-third of the way along her length. The Admiralty Judge found that the Mancunium was substantially to blame because of the failure of those responsible for her navigation to hold her in control in a flood tide. The skill required to do so was within their competence and they had failed to exercise it. The Mancunium had created a risk of collision by the unreasonable actions of those in charge of her.
Rule 10 – Separation Scheme
Rule 10 of the COLREGs concerns the behaviour of vessels navigating within or near traffic separation schemes. The purpose of Rule 10 is to ensure that maritime traffic navigating in the area demarcated as the traffic separation scheme proceeds in an orderly manner, and in a manner which minimises the risk of any collision or any untoward incidents. Regulation 8 of Chapter V (Safety of Navigation) of SOLAS (International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea)[12] provides that the IMO is the only organisation competent to deal with international measures concerning the routing of ships. The effectiveness of traffic separation schemes can be judged from a study made by the International Association of Institutes of Navigation (IAIN) in 1981.
According to the study, between 1956 and 1960, there were 60 collisions in the Straits of Dover; 20 years later with the introduction of traffic separation schemes, the number of collisions was reduced to 16. In other areas where such schemes did not exist, the number of collisions rose sharply.
Rule 13 – Overtaking
Under Rule 13, a vessel is deemed to be coming up with another when there is some proximity in space between them even though there is no risk of collision at that time.[13]
When a vessel is in any doubt as to whether she is overtaking another, she must assume that this is the case and act; accordingly, see r 13(c).[14]
Any subsequent alteration of the bearing between the two vessels does not make the overtaking vessel a crossing vessel or relieve her of the duty of keeping clear of the overtaken vessel until she is finally past and clear; see r 13(d).[15]
In the case of Iran Torab,[16] a collision occurred in 1984 between the vessels Tan and Iran Torab in the Khor Musa Bar Channel during a convoy. The Iran Torab attempted to overtake Tan but failed to maintain a safe distance and a proper lookout, leading to the collision. The court found Iran Torab 80% to blame, as it steered a converging course and did not keep clear of Tan. Tan, the overtaken vessel, was 20% to blame for not altering its course in time to avoid the collision. Both vessels were found to be liable, but Iran Torab’s actions were deemed to be more blameworthy.
Rule 15 – Crossing Situation
Under Rule 15, it is provided that when two power-driven vessels are crossing with a risk of collision, the vessel with the other on her starboard side must keep out of the way and avoid crossing ahead.
If two vessels are on courses that would bring them to the same point simultaneously, they are considered to be crossing. When crossing, range lights should be distinctly open and with one sidelight being clearly visible.
The rules should be clear, yet this is one of the most common types of collision that occur due to factors such as high speed, which reduces the time for accurate hazard assessment, increasing the likelihood of mistakes and collisions.[17]
In The Toni,[18] the court found that the officer of the watch on board one of the ships seemed to not understand what a crossing situation under the Collision Regulations was or what ships in such a situation were supposed to do. On the facts, both ships were found to be equally blameworthy and causative. Thus, the court apportioned the liability equally.
Conclusion
In conclusion, ship collisions are complex events influenced by various factors, ranging from human error to miscommunication and regulatory breaches. The cases discussed above highlight the importance of adhering to navigational rules, such as those set out in the COLREGs, to prevent collisions and ensure maritime safety. Proper lookout, safe speed, accurate risk assessment, and a clear understanding of navigational responsibilities are critical in minimising the risks of collisions at sea.
- Salvage from the Sea’ by Commander Gerald Forsberg, OBE, FNI, RN, Master Mariner Maritime Law, Christopher Hill, LLP 4th Edition page 251.
- Maritime Law, Christopher Hill, LLP 4th Edition page 251.
- The Royal Sovereign (1950) 84 L1.L.Rep. 543
- RS (1950) 84 LLL. Rep. 549.
- The Peter Benoit (1915) 85 LJ 12 HL.
- The “Linde” [1969] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 556 at page 569.
- United Kingdom Maritime Conventions Act 1911, section 1.
- The “Anneliese” [1970] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 355 at page 363.
- The “Sea Star” [1976] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 477, CA.
- The “E.R. Wallonia” [1987] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 485.
- The “Mancunium” [1987] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 627.
- International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, Chapter V, Regulation 8.
- See The Nowy Sac: [1979] QB 236 at 246, 247, [1978] 2 All ER 297 at 303, [1977] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 91.
- See rule 13(c).
- Cf rule 13(d) and The Nowy Sacz, (supra).
- The “Iran Torab” [1988] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 38.
- See Collision and Their Causes by Richard A Cahill, Fairplay Publications 1983 at page 58.
- The “Toni” [1974] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 489 CA.