Summary: Amidst increasing geopolitical risk globally, India may need to assess its current ‘strategic autonomy’ approach to multi-alignment. This article examines the relationship between India and the US, explores a potential Middle Powers strategy premised on India’s alignment with Europe, and underscores the importance of India strengthening its engagement with the Global South to achieve its geopolitical ambitions amidst shifting global dynamics.
Rising geopolitical risk
Geopolitical risk currently is at an unprecedented level due to ongoing concerns such as potential trade wars, armed conflicts, border tensions, and disputes over shared natural resources, and it affects everybody. Governments are increasing required to dedicate substantial time and resources to mitigate these external market risks to economic growth. Corporate boardrooms, too, are not only factoring in these risks as part of their business strategy; they are under pressure to proactively find ways to identify, assess, scenario plan and mitigate such risks. Individuals accustomed to global travel, education and migration are now finding these opportunities increasingly risk-laden.
Strategic autonomy for multi-alignment
Numerous articles discuss the concept of “strategic autonomy” in relation to multi-alignment, arguing that in a multipolar world, India should maintain its independent position on various issues with its partners and allies, based on national interest. At first glance, this doctrine appears promising, potentially allowing engagement with strong economies through free trade or bilateral agreements, while adopting a pragmatic approach with others. Such a strategy aims to navigate complex external headwinds, avoid wars and expand the Indian economy through external markets. However, rapidly evolving geopolitical events necessitate a thorough assessment of risks associated with the current direction of the strategic autonomy doctrine’s multi-alignment approach.
India and the US
India’s relationship with the United States has advanced considerably since the period when the US viewed India primarily through the Cold War lens and aligned itself with Pakistan during the 1971 Bangladesh war. The strengthening bilateral relationship between the two countries is evident in the ongoing nuclear energy agreements, increased participation of the US nuclear energy companies in India, backed by the US government, following the February 2025 Budget announcement, and now the crowning prospect of a US-India Bilateral Trade Agreement.
Yet, the current US administration’s unpredictability regarding trade policies, tariffs, visas, references to US intervention in the post Pahalgam bilateral dispute with Pakistan, and its maintenance of a geostrategic and security relationship with Pakistan, necessitates that India strategically evaluate the downside risks within its necessary and important relationship with the US.
India, EU and the Middle Powers approach
Geopolitical commentators and former diplomats who recognise the risks of over reliance on the US advocate a middle powers doctrine, recommending greater cooperation between India and Europe to bolster India’s strategic autonomy and balancing role in global affairs. The tensions between the US and Europe on the future of the transatlantic alliance and the war with Ukraine have led these commentators to favour this approach.
However, proponents of the Franco-German leadership as the basis for a middle powers alliance in Europe often overlook the increasing influence of far-right populist political parties in Western Europe. These parties have a sceptical view of the EU and promote a more strident, inward-looking nationalism. Beyond Brexiteers in the United Kingdom, Viktor Orban, the Prime Minister of Hungary, and Geert Wilders in Netherlands, represent this school of thought. Despite concerted efforts by the establishments to hold off Marine Le Pen’s National Rally in France, Alice Weidel’s AfD in Germany or Nigel Farage’s Reform UK, these parties are rising in popularity and are being increasingly recognised by commentators as credible oppositions.
What about the Global South?
While recognising past civilisational bonds, commentators critical of the centrality of Global South highlight the illusion of the heydays of the post-colonial Bandung conference, which foundered on the rocks of the 1962 war with China. India’s ongoing border tensions/ disputes with China have influenced its perceptions of the Global South. ASEAN’s attempts to involve India in Asian economic relationships have been rebuffed, as shown by India’s withdrawal from the RCEP and claims that ASEAN acts as the B team of China, allowing round tripping of Chinese goods into India through ASEAN. In our immediate neighbourhood in South Asia, there is concern regarding China’s “String of Pearls” containment strategy, reflected in Sri Lankan ports development and the trilateral China-Bangladesh-Pakistan relationship.
Hence, whilst professing lip service to the Global South, advocates of the doctrine of strategic autonomy, have taken on a markedly Western tilt. This Western tilt, in terms of UN or IAEA votes, may alienate some in the Global South, but for such advocates, it seems like a small price to pay. The need to maintain a stronger link with the West, given that China may be a senior partner in terms of the relationship with Russia, our traditional defence supplier, has played into this tilt. This interpretation of strategic autonomy highlights the non-alignment aspect of foreign policy, without specifically associating it with the Global South.
However, this interpretation of the multi-alignment approach within the strategic autonomy doctrine may be problematic for three primary reasons. First, in the face of an increasingly isolationist US and a Europe embroiled in Ukraine, India’s geopolitical security is best served by being a strong economy. China’s significant role in global production, as reflected in India’s increasing trade deficit with China post its withdrawal from the RCEP, and China’s current control on certain minerals, suggests that India’s economic growth will depend on engaging with existing global value chains involving China and Southeast Asia, rather than focusing solely on a China+1 strategy.
Second, it ignores the reality of market trends and potential. Indian corporates, both large and start-ups, are increasingly venturing into developing countries in Asia and beyond, in Africa or Latin America, to secure supply chains and markets, with outbound foreign direct investment reaching $32.5 billion across sectors and business segments. The developing country numbers are not the largest, but represent significant promise.
Third, India cannot oppose China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in the Global South by merely referencing debt burden issues. Given the relative sizes of the two economies, India cannot muster the fiscal space to mount a state-driven counter to BRI. However, by launching a public private partnership (PPP), geopolitical engagement with the Global South can be effectively promoted. Such a PPP strategy would combine three things — Indian companies seeking to export and invest abroad; market instruments like incubators, accelerators, export credit, guarantees and political risk insurance; and public sector FTAs, bilateral trade agreements and bilateral investment treaties, as well as regional cooperation platforms.
Translating India’s geopolitical ambition
For India to effectively realise its geopolitical ambitions amid shifting global dynamics, it is essential to acknowledge the critical role of the Global South in shaping the country’s pursuit of strategic autonomy through multi-alignment. Furthermore, successfully implementing this strategy and managing associated geopolitical risks will require robust collaboration between the public and private sectors.
