Dispensing with proof of criminal intent for crimes mala prohibita does not discharge the prosecution of its burden to show that the accused did the prohibited act intentionally. This was the ruling of the Supreme Court in the fairly recent case of Felix G. Valenzona v. People of the Philippines (G.R. 248584, 30 August 2023), a case involving a criminal complaint against the president of a real estate company for violation of P.D. 957.
Sometime in 2003, the real estate company entered into two contracts to sell with Ricardo Porteo, covering two subdivision lots. However, upon verification with the Registry of Deeds, Porteo found that the said contracts were not registered, certifying that the real estate company had filed no contract to sell. Worse, Porteo discovered that the subject lots had been sold to different buyers, and thus, he demanded a refund of the payments he had made. The real estate company denied his request. This prompted Porteo to file a criminal complaint against Valenzona for violation of Section 17 of P.D. 957, which mandates all contracts to sell and other similar instruments relating to the sale of subdivision lots and condominium units, whether or not the purchase price is paid in full, shall be registered by the seller in the Register of Deeds where the property is situated. In his defense, Valenzona claimed that as president of the real estate company, it is not among his functions to register documents since they have a different department handling the same.
In reversing the Court of Appeals’ conviction, the Supreme Court stressed that a violation of P.D. 957 is registered as malum prohibitum. This means that the forbidden act (non-registration of contract to sell) is not inherently immoral but punished because the law says it is forbidden. Hence, in crimes mala prohibita, as in this case, the sole issue is whether the law has been violated.
Nevertheless, dispensing with proof of criminal intent for crimes mala prohibita does not, in any way, discharge the prosecution of its burden to show that the accused did the prohibited act intentionally. On this note, it is important to distinguish between intent to commit the crime and intent to perpetrate the act. While a person may not have consciously intended to commit a crime regarded as malum prohibitum, he or she may still be held liable if he or she did intend to commit an act that is, by the very nature of things, the crime itself. Thus, for mala prohibita acts, the intent to perpetrate the prohibited act under the special law must nevertheless be shown.
In contrast to crimes mala in se, which presuppose that the person who did the felonious act had criminal intent, crimes mala prohibita do not require such knowledge or criminal intent; rather, what is crucial is volition or the intent to commit the act. While volition or voluntariness refers to knowledge of the act being done (as opposed to knowledge of the nature of the act), criminal intent is the state of mind that goes beyond voluntariness, and it is this intent that is punished by crimes mala in se. Succinctly put, for crimes mala in se, there must be proof of criminal intent, while for crimes mala prohibita, it is sufficient that the prohibited act is done freely and consciously.
As applied here, even if a violation of P.D. 957 is malum prohibitum, the Supreme Court clarified that it must still be established that the accused had the volition or intent to commit the prohibited act, which is the non-registration of the subject contracts. In this case, the subject contracts were eventually rescinded, and Valenzona and Porteo entered into a compromise agreement where they agreed to settle the civil aspect of the case, which also led to Porteo’s execution of an affidavit of desistance. Hence, these should have led the lower courts to be more prudent in deciding the instant case against Valenzona, especially since what is involved here is the deprivation of his right to liberty.
