When relationships end, disputes often begin—not over emotions, but over property. The law has long provided clear rules for married couples and even for certain heterosexual partnerships. But what happens when the parties are a same-sex couple, whose relationship remains outside the institution of marriage under Philippine law?
This question reached the Supreme Court in Josef v. Ursua (G.R. No. 267469, 5 February 2025), where the Court confronted, for the first time, whether property co-ownership may arise from same-sex cohabitation. The ruling represents a noteworthy development in Philippine jurisprudence—not by redefining marriage, but by affirming fairness in property relations.
The case arose from a Complaint for Partition between partners JCJ and EGU, who purchased a house and lot in Quezon City in 2006 while living together as a couple. A year later, EGU executed an Acknowledgment of Third-Party Interest in Real Property. Unfortunately, the document contained ambiguous provisions regarding JCJ’s ownership share.
Two interpretations emerged. One suggested that JCJ’s interest would depend entirely on documentary proof of contribution. The other presumed a 50% ownership in JCJ’s favor, subject only to adjustment if records demonstrated a greater share.
To resolve the ambiguity, the Court applied familiar principles of contract interpretation.
First, the doctrine of contra proferentem dictates that ambiguities are construed against the party who drafted the instrument. Since EGU authored the acknowledgment, any uncertainty in its terms could not operate in her favor.
Second, where competing interpretations are equally reasonable, the construction most favorable to the party for whose benefit the provision was made should prevail. Applying this principle, the Court adopted the interpretation recognizing a presumptive 50% ownership in favor of JCJ, clarifying that documentary evidence would matter only if it established a larger share.
Accordingly, JCJ was recognized as co-owner and entitled to half of the property.
The more consequential aspect of the ruling, however, lies in the Court’s treatment of the parties’ relationship. While acknowledging that JCJ and EGU were legally incapable of marrying under Philippine law, the Court nonetheless held that their cohabitation produced property relations governed by Article 148 of the Family Code.
Article 148 applies to couples who live together without a valid marriage. Property acquired during such cohabitation becomes co-owned provided two elements are present: acquisition during the relationship and proof of actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry. Once contribution is shown, the law presumes equal sharing.
Here, the acknowledgment itself admitted JCJ’s contribution. The legal consequence was straightforward—the presumption of equal ownership arose. The Court thus granted the complaint for partition and remanded the case for further proceedings.
Many advocates have welcomed the decision as a meaningful step toward recognizing the property rights of LGBTQ+ individuals. Yet the Court exercised deliberate restraint. As Justice Amy Lazaro-Javier observed in her Concurring Opinion, granting the full bundle of rights accorded to heterosexual relationships remains beyond judicial authority absent legislative action.
The decision therefore walks a careful constitutional line. It does not redefine marriage, nor does it create a new legal status. Instead, it affirms a more modest but enduring principle: equity follows contribution. When two persons build property together, the law will not disregard economic reality merely because their relationship falls outside traditional legal categories.
In the end, Josef v. Ursua is less about expanding institutions than about preserving fairness. The Court did not alter the legal definition of relationships—but it ensured that justice, at least in matters of property, remains attentive to contribution rather than labels.
