Marriage is constitutionally protected as an inviolable social institution. But the Constitution itself does not require the impossible. It does not compel spouses to remain bound in a union that, from the very beginning, lacked the psychological capacity to exist as a marriage at all.
This delicate balance once again took center stage in Kusk v. Republic, where the Supreme Court revisited the contours of Article 36 of the Family Code—psychological incapacity—and reaffirmed that while marriage is favored, it is not indestructible by legal fiction.
In this case, a Filipina wife sought the declaration of nullity of her marriage to a foreign husband marked by violence, abandonment, womanizing, and chronic irresponsibility. The trial court and the Court of Appeals denied the petition, relying on the familiar reflex that bad behavior, no matter how egregious, does not automatically amount to psychological incapacity.
The Supreme Court disagreed.
Citing Tan-Andal v. Andal, the Court emphasized that Article 36 is no longer governed by rigid, checklist-driven formalism. Psychological incapacity is not measured by labels, diagnoses, or the mechanical presence of psychiatric reports. What the law demands is clear and convincing evidence that an enduring part of a spouse’s personality structure made compliance with essential marital obligations impossible from the start.
The Court reiterated three controlling characteristics: juridical antecedence, gravity, and incurability. Juridical antecedence does not require that the incapacity be obvious at the wedding ceremony; it suffices that the roots existed prior to marriage. Incurability is not medical hopelessness but legal permanence—an incapacity so persistent that reconciliation is no longer reasonably possible. Gravity, finally, excludes mere stubbornness, immaturity, or occasional cruelty; the incapacity must be so profound that it negates the very idea of partnership.
Applying these standards, the Court found that both spouses were psychologically incapacitated. The wife entered the marriage driven by entitlement and control; the husband was shaped by passivity, antisocial tendencies, and emotional irresponsibility. Their union was not merely dysfunctional—it was structurally doomed. From the outset, neither could give meaning to mutual love, respect, fidelity, and support.
Significantly, the Court clarified a long-misunderstood point: a psychological examination of the respondent spouse is not indispensable. Marriage is lived by two, but the totality of a spouse’s conduct is often best—and sometimes only—known by the other. Expert testimony based on collateral information does not become hearsay simply because one spouse refuses to participate. Courts must assess credibility, not dismiss evidence wholesale.
This ruling is not an invitation to casual annulments. On the contrary, it strengthens Article 36 by restoring its original intent: relief for those trapped in marriages that were void from inception, not merely difficult or disappointing. It rejects both extremes—the indiscriminate dissolution of marriages and the blind preservation of unions that never truly existed in law.
In the end, Kusk v. Republic reminds us that the law’s compassion lies not in loosening standards, but in applying them with discernment. Marriage deserves protection—but truth deserves recognition. When a marriage fails before it even begins, the law must have the courage to say so.
