In the past year, news headlines have seen an increased frequency in contempt citations of Congress during the widely publicized legislative inquiries. Contempt in cases of repeated refusals to answer or arrest orders for failure to appear have led to the question: what is the basis and extent of Congress’ power to cite a resource person in contempt?
In the recent case of Linconn Uy Ong v. Senate of the Philippines, et. al. (G.R. No. 257401, 28 March 2023), the Supreme Court En Banc explained that Congress’ powers of contempt and arrest are inherent mechanisms implicit in its power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. As expressly granted by Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, “The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in, or affected by, such inquiries shall be respected.”
The Court in Ong explained that the power to conduct such inquiries includes the mechanisms available to both the Senate and House of Representatives to effectively perform their legislative functions. In particular, the power of contempt enables the Senate or the House of Representatives to compel the availability of information necessary in shaping legislation. As quoted by the Supreme Court, “Indeed, the exercise of the contempt power by the Legislature is anchored on the principle of self-preservation. As that branch of the government vested with the legislative power, it can assert its authority and punish contumacious acts against it independently of the Judicial Branch. Such power of the Legislature is sui generis as it attaches not to the discharge of legislative functions per se but to the character of the Legislature as one of the three independent and coordinate branches of government.”
Further, the Court in Ong also noted the Congress’ power to arrest a witness when necessary to carry out the coercive process of compelling attendance, testimony, and production of documents relevant and material in a legislative inquiry. The Court reiterated its ruling in the landmark case of Jean Arnault v. Leon Nazareno (G.R. No. L-3820, 18 July 1950) that information which is volunteered is not always accurate or complete, thus some means of compulsion is essential to obtain what is needed.
The Court in Ong thus emphasized that even if the power to arrest is not expressly laid out in the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation, the power of the Senate to conduct investigations must be accompanied by the processes to enforce it. As stated, “as long as the testimony of a resource person is primordial in the Legislature’s inquiry in aid of legislation, then any House of Congress or its committees may compel, by way of an arrest, his or her appearance in the inquiry proceedings.”
However, it must be emphasized that such powers of Congress are not absolute. The Court in Ong stressed that Congress’ power of legislative investigation is subject to three limitations:
(1) the inquiry must be in “aid of legislation,”
(2) the inquiry must be conducted in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure, and
(3) the rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.
The Court further noted that the duration of a resource person’s detention must only last until the termination of the legislative inquiry. For witnesses charged with giving false or evasive testimony, the Court also stated that they must be accorded stricter due process requirements, such as the opportunity to explain one’s side before being penalized.
In the landmark case of Romulo Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations (G.R. No. 180643, 25 March 2008), the Court also noted the following limitations: “Publication of the rules of the inquiry is an essential requirement of due process. Two, the rights of persons appearing before the investigating committees, or affected by such inquiries, must be respected. These rights include the right against self-incrimination as well as the right to privacy of communications and correspondence of a private nature.”
In conclusion, it is clear that while Congress is afforded the necessary mechanisms to fulfill its legislative role, the same must always be balanced with due process and the rights of the subject resource persons. As aptly explained by the Supreme Court in Ong, “It bears underscoring that the purpose of the Committee’s proceedings is to conduct an inquiry or investigation to aid the Senate in crafting relevant legislation, and not to conduct a trial or make an adjudication. Legislative inquiries do not share the same goals as the criminal trial process, and cannot be punitive in the sense that they cannot result in legally binding deprivation of a person’s life, liberty or property.’ Thus, punishment for legislative contempt, albeit sui generis in character, must similarly observe the minimum requirements of due process.”
