In Sir Elly Kadoorie & Sons Limited v. Samantha Jane Bradley [2026] HKCFA 2, the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal (CFA) has, for the first time at the highest judicial level, confirmed that the common law tort of harassment forms part of Hong Kong law. The judgment provides authoritative clarification on the elements and scope of the tort and, critically, on the extent to which corporate entities may seek relief where harassment is alleged.
The decision resolves long standing uncertainty created by inconsistent first instance authority. It is particularly significant for employers and corporate litigants, as the CFA drew a clear distinction between claims for damages (which remain personal) and the availability of injunctive relief in the employment and litigation context.
Background
The dispute arose from the termination of the Defendant’s employment as a senior executive of the Plaintiff company. Following termination, the Defendant sent more than 500 emails to the Plaintiff, its officers, employees and external legal advisers. The emails were repetitive, hostile and alleged serious wrongdoing, which was pleaded to be unfounded.
The sustained flow of communications caused operational disruption and distress to its recipients. The Plaintiff commenced proceedings both in its own name and by way of a representative action on behalf of affected employees and agents, seeking damages for harassment and injunctive relief.
At first instance, the claim was struck out. The Court of Appeal upheld the view that a company could not sue in harassment but held that the Court might nevertheless grant injunctive relief. The matter was ultimately determined by the CFA.
Recognition of the tort of harassment under Hong Kong common law
The CFA confirmed that the tort of harassment exists under common law in Hong Kong. The Court characterised its recognition as a natural and incremental development, necessary to ensure that the common law remains responsive to contemporary social conditions, including modern forms of electronic communication and sustained online abuse.
While cautioning against rigid definition, the CFA endorsed the following core elements1:
- A course of conduct that is sufficiently repetitive, unreasonable and oppressive, which causes, and which the harasser knows or ought reasonably to know would cause, worry, alarm, distress or annoyance to the victim.
- The conduct must objectively amount to harassment in the ordinary sense of the word.
- The harasser must have acted intentionally or recklessly as to whether harm would be caused.
- The victim must have suffered actual damage caused by the harassment.
The Court clarified that harassment is not established by purely economic loss. Emotional or psychological harm is central to the tort, though once such harm is shown, consequential financial loss may also be recoverable. As a general rule, damages for mere upset or injured feelings (short of actionable harm) remain unavailable2.
The CFA deliberately left room for future refinement, particularly to maintain an appropriate balance between protection from harassment and fundamental freedoms such as freedom of expression.
Can a company sue for harassment?
The CFA held conclusively that a company cannot sue in its own right for the tort of harassment. Harassment is a personal wrong directed at emotional or psychological well being. As a legal person incapable of experiencing distress or anxiety, a company cannot satisfy an essential element of the tort and therefore has no standing to claim damages.
The Court rejected arguments that emotional harm suffered by employees could be attributed to the company, or that financial loss alone should suffice. Extending the tort in that way would undermine its conceptual coherence and risk transforming harassment into a surrogate commercial tort.
However, the CFA made clear that this conclusion does not strip companies of protection. While a company has no cause of action in harassment, the same conduct may interfere with other legal interests capable of supporting equitable relief, particularly in an employment setting.
Availability of Broadmoor-type injunctions
The most significant practical development lies in the CFA’s recognition of an expanded category of equitable relief, drawing on the Broadmoor line of authority. Traditionally, Broadmoor injunctions allow public bodies to restrain conduct interfering with the discharge of statutory duties, even where the body has no cause of action against the wrongdoer.
The CFA extended this reasoning to the employment context. It held that where harassment of current employees interferes with an employer’s non delegable common law duty to provide a safe working environment, the employer has standing to seek injunctive relief, notwithstanding the absence of a harassment claim.
That said, the jurisdiction is carefully confined:
- it protects only current employees;
- it is limited to harassment affecting the workplace or working environment (which may include electronic communications and remote working settings); and
- it does not extend to conduct unconnected with employment or occurring purely in employees’ private lives.
Relief remains equitable and discretionary. Courts must assess proportionality and competing fundamental rights, especially freedom of expression.
Harassment of external lawyers
The CFA also addressed harassment directed at a company’s external lawyers. Although external lawyers are neither employees nor agents in the employment sense, the Court held that harassment of legal advisers may justify injunctive relief where it interferes with the company’s right to obtain legal advice and representation.
That right is constitutionally protected and applies equally to corporate entities. Harassment of lawyers may obstruct litigation, deter representation, increase costs, or otherwise impair access to legal services. Where such interference is established, the company has sufficient legal interest to seek an injunction.
The focus of the relief is the client’s right to legal advice, not the personal rights of the lawyers. Any protection afforded to lawyers is incidental. As a general rule, once the lawyer’s retainer ends, this basis for relief falls away and any continuing harassment must be addressed by the lawyers themselves.
Representative actions
The CFA confirmed that representative proceedings may be brought where the company and its employees or lawyers share a sufficient common interest and seek the same injunctive relief. In such cases, the requirement of “same interest” is satisfied.
However, this procedural mechanism is limited. It supports claims for injunctive relief only. Claims for damages remain personal and cannot be pursued by a company on behalf of others. Once the injunctive phase concludes, the commonality of interest may cease.
Key takeaways
- Harassment is now firmly part of Hong Kong common law. The CFA has resolved uncertainty and provided a clear doctrinal framework.
- The tort remains personal. Companies cannot claim damages for harassment.
- A new injunctive pathway is available. Employers may seek injunctions to restrain workplace harassment that interferes with their duty to provide a safe working environment.
- Protection extends to legal representation. Harassment of external lawyers may be restrained where it obstructs access to legal advice.
- Careful pleading is critical. The legal basis for injunctive relief must be expressly pleaded; failure to do so may be fatal even where conduct is serious.
Conclusion
The CFA’s decision provides authoritative guidance on the scope and limits of harassment claims in Hong Kong. It confirms harassment as a personal common law tort while drawing a clear boundary against corporate claims for damages.
At the same time, the Court has pragmatically expanded equitable protection to address modern workplace and litigation realities. Employers now have a recognised route to seek injunctive relief where harassment undermines workplace safety, and companies may act to restrain conduct that interferes with access to legal advice.
The judgment marks a significant development in Hong Kong tort and equity jurisprudence and will have lasting implications for employment disputes, litigation strategy and workplace risk management.
For further information, please contact:
Richard Keady, Partner, Dentons
richard.keady@dentons.com
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