Summary: The Supreme Court of India, in Maniyar Iliyaz v. P. Ayyappan, declared the right to walk on footpaths alongside roads a fundamental right under the Part III of the Constitution, prioritising pedestrian movement over vehicles. The case originated from a fatal accident on a road lacking pedestrian infrastructure, prompting the SC to mandate civic bodies to ensure demarcated footpaths. The SC recognised legislative gaps and called for statutory frameworks and a full-time regulator. While progressive, the ruling raises practical questions about implementation, enforcement, and balancing competing urban interests, emphasising that the real impact depends on tangible improvements to pedestrian safety.
Introduction and Factual Context
On June 19, 2026, a division bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India (“SC”), comprising Hon’ble Justice P.S. Narsimha and Hon’ble Justice A.S. Chandurkar, in Maniyar Iliyaz @Shaik Riyaz & Anr. v. P. Ayyappan & Ors.[1] (“Maniyar”),declared that the right to walk on demarcated footpaths alongside motorised roads is a fundamental right under Part III of the Constitution of India. What began as an unremarkable motor accident compensation dispute, arising from the tragic death of a five-year-old child struck by a tanker on a road devoid of footpaths or pedestrian crossings, the absence of which, as the SC noted, caused the accident, has culminated in one of the most significant constitutional pronouncements on pedestrian rights in recent Indian jurisprudence.
On a purely factual basis, Maniyar was a routine adjudication of compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (“MV Act”), where the SC enhanced the award to INR 11,44,628. However, the SC chose not to confine itself to the arithmetic amount of compensation payable under the MV Act. The SC instead treated the absence of pedestrian infrastructure as an occasion to initiate a comprehensive constitutional inquiry, declaring that the fundamental right to walk on demarcated footpaths shall have priority and precedence over movement by motorised vehicles.
The SC directed that the right to walk must “extend to guaranteeing access to safe and well demarcated footpath” and held that a correlative and enforceable duty lies upon urban development authorities, municipal corporations, municipalities, and even panchayats to ensure that wherever a road exists, a footpath must be demarcated and maintained for pedestrians.
Underscoring the gravity of its pronouncement, the SC further directed that the matter be re-numbered as a petition under Article 32 of the Indian Constitution with cause title of Re: Fundamental Right to Walk and Footpath under Article 32, and that the Union of India through the Ministries of Housing and Urban Affairs, Rural Development, and Road Transport and Highways be impleaded as parties. The SC also directed that copies be sent to the Law Commission to initiate a dedicated statutory framework, independent of the MV Act.
The Constitutional Framework: Article 19(1)(d) Rediscovered
As per the SC, the right to walk finds its constitutional home in Article 19(1)(d) of the Indian Constitution, which guarantees all citizens the right “to move freely throughout the territory of India”. This article has long been associated with inter-state migration and the freedom to travel across geographic boundaries, so much so that the SC observed, “the phrase ‘pedestrian’ has acquired pejorative shades”, and the MV Act “has been an impediment and, in many ways undermined the precious rights of walkers”.
Through Maniyar, the SC appears to have undertaken a deliberate correction of the cultural and legal marginalisation of walking as a mode of movement, by emphasising that “the primary right of movement under Article 19(1)(d) is the Fundamental Right to Walk, a right that precedes the right to move on wheels”.
To underscore the civilisational significance of walking, the SC invoked the Dandi March, Kanwar Yatra, Nagar Sankirtan, Pandharpur Wari, and the Bhoodan Movement, observing that the freedom to walk “certainly embodies expressional, congregational and associational rights under Article 19(1)(a), Article 19(1)(b) and Article 19(1)(c)”. The composite declaration thus roots the right in Article 19(1)(d), read with Articles 19(1)(a), 19(1)(b), 19(1)(c), and Article 21.
The Legislative Gap
Perhaps the most architecturally significant portion of Maniyar is the SC’s exposition of the relationship between fundamental rights and their legislative effectuation. The SC observed that Parliament has historically enacted dedicated statutes to operationalise fundamental rights: the Right to Education Act, 2009 (effectuating Article 21A), the National Food Security Act, 2013 (effectuating Article 21), and the Right to Information Act, 2005 (effectuating Article 19(1)(a)). Each of these statutes follows a common template: declaration of the right, identification of duty-bearers, provision of remedies, and establishment of a full-time regulatory body. The SC noted that insofar as the “right to walk on demarcated footpaths is concerned, though it is integral to Articles 21 and 19(1)(d), there is no legislation”, and directed that copies of the judgement be sent to the Law Commission and relevant Ministries to initiate the necessary legal framework.In effect, the SC has identified a structural gap in India’s pedestrian rights-effectuation framework and has set in motion the institutional process to ensure that this right is given concrete statutory form and rendered meaningfully enforceable.
Life, Liberty, and the Pedestrian: Article 21 Implications
While the SC’s formal declaration anchors the right primarily in Article 19(1)(d), its repeated characterisation of walking as “integral to life” and its express invocation of Article 21 carry implications that prima facie warrant closer attention. Article 21’s guarantee of life and personal liberty has, through decades of expansive interpretation, come to encompass the right to livelihood, shelter, health, and a clean environment.Recognising pedestrian safety as an integral part of right to life is a natural extension of this jurisprudence, but one with distinct practical consequences.
First, unlike Article 19, which is available only to citizens, Article 21 protects “any person”, potentially extending the right to walk to non-citizens residing in India.Second, Article 21claims are not governed by the“reasonable restrictions”framework of Article 19(2)-(6); they attract the broader“due process”standard following K.S. Puttaswamy[2]. This elevates the criteria for any limitation of pedestrian space, requiring a higher threshold to be met.Third, the SC’s articulation in Maniyar of a restitutionary remedy enforceable under Sections 38-40 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, independent of the MV Act, confirms that pedestrian rights violations are now constitutionally cognisable causes of action, not mere incidents of urban inconvenience but breaches of a life-and-liberty guarantee.
The Road Ahead and Conclusion
The SC’s call for “a full-time regulator to plan, enforce, and implement this precious right” is perhaps the judgement’s most forward-looking directive. Drawing from the institutional design of the Information Commission(s), Food Commission(s), and the National Commission for Protection of Child Rights, the SC has envisaged a body with perpetual succession, domain expertise, and institutional accountability. From this directive, it appears that the SC views pedestrian rights as an issue requiring a permanent specialised mechanism, instead of an ad hoc administrative action or case-by-case judicial interventions.
Further, Maniyar prima facie appears significant for the constitutional architecture it sets in motion. It appears to re-order the hierarchy of road users by giving primacy to pedestrians over motor vehicles while casting civic bodies as duty-bearers answerable under Part III. Importantly, Maniyar opens a restitutionary channel entirely independent of the MV Act’s compensation regime.
Yet the judgement leaves questions for future litigation: what constitutes a “demarcated footpath” sufficient to discharge duty? Can the right be invoked against encroachments on footpaths by private vendors and parked vehicles that routinely occupy pedestrian space? How will courts balance pedestrian claims against competing demands of road-widening for public transport? Can urban bodies and municipalities guarantee footpaths accessible to pedestrians at every motorable road, given the huge investment requirements? Additionally, in Maniyar, it is important to note that the SC suggests a regulator, but with only general directions and without clear timelines, which may hinder implementation of this directive.
Undoubtedly, the Maniyar judgement appears to be progressive, and rights oriented, however, on-ground execution is what will determine fruition. Maniyar’s real impact will be judged not by the elegance of its declaration, but by whether India’s streets genuinely become safer for people to walk on, and whether the State considers the absence of footpaths or pedestrian-friendly infrastructure as a constitutional issue requiring urgent redress.
For further information, please contact:
Monark Gahlot, Partner, Cyril Amarchand Mangaldas
monark.gahlot@cyrilshroff.com
[1] Maniyar Iliyaz v. P. Ayyappan, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 1162.
[2] Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) v. Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 1
